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Monetary Policy in a Changing World
Thomas M. Hoenig,
President
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Presented to the Money Marketeers
New York City
September 19, 2000
As you know, many discussions of monetary policy tend to get rather myopic,
focusing extensively on the latest data released and their implications for
what the FOMC is likely to do at its next meeting. While interesting and
important, the downside in such a short-run perspective is that we too often
see the trees but not the forest. While we focus on data in great detail, we
fail to observe fundamental changes in the economic environment in which
monetary policy operates.
This evening, I would like to take a somewhat different tack
and offer a longer term perspective on some current and future challenges
facing monetary policy. More specifically, I would like to discuss the broad
issue of how monetary policy might cope with ongoing changes in the
structure of the economy and financial markets.
Generally speaking, these changes can affect monetary policy in at least a
couple of ways. First, they can complicate the process of deciding when a
policy action should be taken -- that is, when the FOMC should change the
federal funds rate target. Second, some of these structural changes may
affect the implementation of monetary policy by requiring changes in
operating procedures or the institutional framework of policy.
In this regard, there are three developments I will focus on
here this evening. The first is the apparent change in the structure of the
inflation process in recent years that has made it more difficult to produce
reliable inflation forecasts. This development has led to some subtle but
significant changes in monetary policy decision- making.
A second issue is the impact of a shrinking supply of
Treasury securities on monetary policy. When the public thinks about
surpluses and deficit reduction, I suspect that there is little
consideration of their potential impact on monetary policy. Yet, the reduced
supply of Treasuries has, for example, already affected yield spreads and
the usefulness of some financial market data as indicators for monetary
policy and, going forward, could affect how the Fed implements policy.
The third topic is the more distant prospect that the spread
of e-money could undermine the role of central banks in conducting monetary
policy. While certainly not something that currently causes sleepless nights
for central bankers, the widespread adoption of e-money could ultimately
affect the implementation of monetary policy in a very fundamental way by
reducing or even eliminating the demand for central bank money.
Understanding the Inflation Process
Let me begin by examining how changes in the inflation
process over the past few years have affected monetary policy
decision-making. As the goal of price stability has become a central focus
of monetary policy over the past decade, the role of inflation forecasts
also has taken on increased importance. At the same time, however, both
traditional indicators of inflationary pressures and formal models of the
inflation process have become less reliable.
A good example is the diminished role of monetary aggregates. In the U.S.
and around the world, there has been less reliance on monetary aggregates
either as targets or information variables because short-run relationships
between money and inflation appear to have broken down in recent years.
Moreover, alternative analytical approaches, such as natural
rate and output gap models, have fared no better. Indeed, it may be safe to
say that we still are working to improve our understanding of the factors
behind the favorable inflation performance of the last few years. In
particular, it is extremely difficult to sort out the relative contributions
of improved productivity vis-à-vis temporary supply factors, such as lower
import prices or reduced health care cost inflation. And going forward,
there are considerable uncertainty and debate over whether this favorable
inflation performance is likely to continue.
I believe that these events have had some subtle but important effects on
monetary policy decision-making over the past several years. One implication
is that there is increasing merit being given to an approach that relies on
a broad set of economic indicators to gauge inflationary pressures. Had the
FOMC focused exclusively on money growth or on measures of labor market
tightness, or relied too heavily on outdated estimates of potential output,
I believe that we would have likely seen less favorable economic performance
over the past few years.
Another important implication for policy is that, in the
face of increased uncertainty about the structure of the economy, it is more
difficult to be preemptive in policy actions. Consequently, there is less
reliance on forecasts of inflation to guide policy, and a greater
inclination to wait for hard evidence of increased inflationary pressures or
expectations before acting. This explains to an important extent the move to
somewhat smaller and more gradual steps early in a policy cycle until a
trend in price movements is more apparent. However, it also implies the need
for a more aggressive response when the uncertainty dissipates and evidence
accumulates that the inflation trajectory is changing.
Debt Reduction and Monetary Policy
A second structural change with potential implications for
monetary policy is the ongoing reduction in the supply of Treasury
securities. This development has altered the information content of
financial market indicators and, if it continues, could also bring about
significant changes in the way the Fed implements monetary policy.
Financial market indicators provide useful information to policymakers in at
least two ways. First, a considerable amount of research that we and others
have conducted in recent years suggest that the yield curve may help
forecast economic activity. In particular, a flattening of the Treasury
yield curve has frequently been associated with a slowdown in economic
activity.
Second, financial market indicators may also provide information about
changing liquidity conditions or assessments of risk. For example, in the
late summer and fall of 1998, we saw indications of heightened risk premia
and lower market liquidity associated with the Russian and developing
country financial crisis.
Over the past several months, as actual and prospective
reductions in the supply of Treasury securities have weighed more heavily on
markets, many of these financial market indicators have become increasingly
difficult to interpret. For example, how much of the flattening of the
Treasury yield curve this year was driven by expectations of slower growth
or reduced inflationary expectations and how much by supply considerations?
Similarly, are increased spreads of private securities over Treasuries due
to changing perceptions of risk or to the reduced supply of Treasury
securities? And, are heightened bid/ask spreads a reflection of temporary
episodes of financial market fragility or, rather, an indication of a longer
term reduction in market liquidity caused by the cutback in supply of
Treasuries?
These issues are not merely academic concerns. Indeed, some
analysts have suggested that the Fed delayed its unwinding of the easing of
policy that occurred in the fall of 1998 because of continuing concern over
the condition of financial markets as reflected in these financial market
indicators. Therefore, some of these same analysts are concerned that policy
remained too easy for too long with potential implications for inflationary
pressures. Going forward, if projections of further reductions in Treasury
supply are accurate, these indicators may become of limited value to
policymakers either in forecasting economic activity or in gauging the
condition of financial markets.
If the amount of Treasury securities continues to decline,
there may be significant implications for the structure of the Fed’s balance
sheet and for how monetary policy is implemented. Currently, Treasury
securities are the principal asset held by the Fed. Outright purchases of
Treasuries provide a long-term source of reserves that supports the secular
growth in currency demand. If there is an inadequate supply of Treasury
securities, the Fed will need to turn to other assets to perform these
functions.
What assets might the Fed use? In the search for possible
alternatives, both history and the experience of other countries may provide
some guidance. If we look back to the early days of the Federal Reserve
System, we find that the discount window played a much more important role
than it does today. Discount window lending was an important source of
reserves, and discounted trade bills also served as collateral for
outstanding currency. Moreover, open market operations in private securities
were used in reserve management. These practices reflected a different time
and set of circumstances including legal restrictions in the Federal Reserve
Act, existing views of the role of the central bank, and the relatively
small size of the government securities market. However, they illustrate
that the central bank did and can again adopt new procedures to meet its
changing environment.
Insight may also be obtained by looking at practices of
other major central banks. Many countries have had to develop monetary
policy operating procedures without large government securities markets.
Historically, several of these countries relied heavily on discount or
lending facilities as the major tool of reserve management and as a
long-term source of reserves. More recently the trend has been toward the
use of large-scale repo operations in a broad range of public and private
securities. Good examples are the changes in operating procedures at the
Bank of England in recent years and the institutional structure of ECB
monetary policy operations.
These comparisons while not forecasting the future suggest
that if there is continuing reduction in the supply of Treasury securities,
the Fed nevertheless has options. These include outright purchase of
non-Treasury securities, large-scale repo operations in non-Treasury
securities, and increased discount window lending to depository
institutions. The exact scope for these operations, of course, will depend
on the Fed’s current and prospective legislative authority.
In the end, the important point of the impending changes may be that while
the Fed’s ability to implement policy via a funds rate target would likely
not be dramatically affected, there could be important effects on Desk
operations as well as implications for financial markets and institutions.
E-Money and Monetary Policy
Thus far, I have focused on structural changes in the
economy and financial markets that have had implications for monetary policy
or might impact policy in the foreseeable future. I would like to close by
looking much further ahead to see how the evolution of the payments system
might affect monetary policy. In this instance, the focus is on the
widespread use of e-money and how some are suggesting that it could,
theoretically, undermine the very foundations of monetary policy.
This issue was raised recently in a couple of provocative
papers, one by Mervyn King presented at the Kansas City Fed’s 1999 Jackson
Hole symposium and another by Benjamin Friedman. Both speculate that the
widespread adoption of privately issued e-money could have far-reaching
implications for central banks.
Their arguments can be illustrated in a simple model of the
demand for and supply of central bank money, where central bank money
consists of currency held by the public and reserve or settlement balances
held at the central bank. In this framework, the central bank implements
policy by altering the supply of central bank money to affect the overnight
interest rate.
This analysis presupposes the existence of a demand for
central bank money, and it is this assumption that is called into question
by King and Friedman. Specifically, they suggest that the widespread use of
e-money could cause both the demand for currency and the demand for
settlement balances to disappear. If so, it would be extremely difficult for
the central bank to operate by controlling the supply of something for which
there is no demand.
We are obviously a very long way from this situation
currently. Indeed, currency, which makes up the dominant share of central
bank money, is growing rapidly. Its growth is being driven both by increased
domestic demand and by greater international demand for dollars. At the same
time, however, the demand for reserve and settlement balances has been
declining in recent years as a result of several factors including lower
reserve requirements, increased use of sweep accounts, and improvements in
payments practices.
The scenario envisioned by King and Friedman would clearly
require some radical changes in existing payments practices by households
and firms and by financial institutions. Smart cards or similar payments
vehicles would need to replace the use of currency. Moreover, depository
institutions would have to settle directly with each other rather than with
the central bank.
In contrast to this view, papers presented at a recent World Bank conference
by Charles Freedman, Charles Goodhart, and Michael Woodford suggest that the
outlook for central banks in a world of e-money may not be quite so bleak.
Indeed, these authors suggest there are both practical and theoretical
reasons for believing that the demand for central bank money will continue
to exist even as e-money becomes more popular.
First, the history of payments systems suggests that new
payments methods do not completely replace old ones because the old methods
may continue to have valuable and unique features. Thus, for example,
e-money is unlikely to completely eliminate currency if users value
currency’s anonymity.
Second, in the unlikely event that depository institutions
are able to agree to a private system of final settlement, legal
restrictions requiring central bank settlement could be imposed. Moreover,
to the extent that the central bank provides settlement services for the
government, the need for the private sector to transact with the government
would also create a demand for central bank balances.
Finally, as Woodford points out, even if the demand for
central bank money truly disappears, this may not be the end of the story.
The central bank could continue to influence short-term interest rates by
directly transacting in an asset, such as overnight loans, for which there
continues to be a demand. Thus, by establishing prices at which it would buy
and sell this asset, the central bank could continue to set a reference
short-term interest rate. Indeed, such a framework may be a natural
evolution of corridor systems of interest rate management that have become
popular among a growing number of central banks.
Opinions obviously differ as to the time frame or even the
likelihood that e-money could have a significant impact on monetary policy.
For example, Europeans appear to have greater concerns than we do, in part,
perhaps because the development of e-money is further along in Europe. It is
worth observing, however, that even short of a worst-case scenario, reserve
management operations could be affected by e-money to the extent that the
demand for or supply of reserves becomes more difficult to forecast.
Concluding Observations
Let me conclude my discussion with some general observations
about monetary policy in a changing world. The theme of my remarks this
evening is that, while monetary policy is always challenging, it is
especially so when there are important structural changes occurring in the
economy or in financial markets.
Perhaps the biggest difficulty policymakers face is in
recognizing that fundamental changes are occurring. Many times it is
difficult to distinguish structural changes from normal cyclical changes
within a time frame that is useful for short-run policy decisions. An
additional factor that may inhibit our ability to recognize structural
change is a natural skepticism among economists about the importance of
these changes. After all, our empirical models of the economy rely heavily
on the existence of stable patterns of behavior over long periods of time.
It is also important to recognize that structural changes
come in different forms and have different implications for monetary policy.
Some changes have their principal impact on short-run policy decisions as to
where to set the federal funds rate target. Other changes may have deeper
effects on the institutional structure of monetary policy and, indeed, may
require fundamental changes in how monetary policy is implemented. Observing
these changes, understanding their meaning and implications, and
distinguishing them from one another are every bit as important as
forecasting next quarter’s GDP, and every bit as difficult.
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